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In 2009, President Barack Obama and a majority Democratic 111th Congress came to office in a favorable position to enact federal climate legislation. But less than two years later prospects for passing that legislation dimmed considerably. Explanations for this quick reversal fault 1) institutional rules requiring bills receive a 60-vote supra-majority to cloture a Senate filibuster; and 2) the Obama administration¡Çs prioritization of health care over climate change. Both of these explanations, however, presume the Democratic Party uniformly backed climate legislation. This seminar uses a logistical regression model on House Bill (H.R.) 2454 (The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009) to demonstrate Democrats were deeply divided on the issue. Long-standing industrial ties and blue dog allegiances suggest that United States climate policy will consist of subnational clean energy and national air quality programs for the foreseeable future. It also implies why single-party states like China will spend less money and time making a low carbon transition.
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